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The Epistemology of Second Best
Gary Lawson*
Second best theory "holds that where it is not possible to satisfy all the
system to reach an overall optimum, it is not
conditions necessaryfor [a] ...
generally desirable to satisfy as many of those conditions as possible." Adrian
Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4,
17 (2009). In other words, iffyou are not moving all the way to the ideal state of
affairs, it is unclearwhetherpartialmoves that seem to go in the direction of the
ideal make the world "better" or "worse" with "better" or "worse" defined
by the same criteria (whatever they may be) that defined your ideal. This Essay
shows how second best theory is even more important and even more (for want
of a better word) subversive than its most familiarapplicationssuggest. Second
best considerations lurk at the core of all processes of acquiring or pursuing
knowledge, including, but not at all limited to, legal knowledge. Put simply, even
assuming away the costs of acquiring and processing new information, more
knowledge will not necessarilylead to better decisions, no matter whatyou think
makes a decision better. The capacity of additionalinformation to lead to better
decisions depends on (1) the shape of the path towardsfull or ideal knowledge,
(2) one's location on that path at a particularmoment of decision, and (3) the
likelihood that one will be able to follow that path to its end. All three of these
factors are highly contingent and often dfficult and perhaps impossible to
ascertain. The bottom line is that knowing less can lead to better decisions than
decisions made while knowing more. That will not always be the case. But it
might sometimes be the case. There is an optimum amount of knowledge for any
particulardecision, and supraoptimalknowledge can be just as bad from the
standpointof decisionalaccuracy as suboptimalknowledge. This has potential
implicationsfor, among other things, the role of expertise in administrativelaw
and evidence law.

Introduction
Imagine an ideal state of affairs. It can be any state of affairs, such as a
political structure, an economic equilibrium, or a knowledge base for
decision-making. The criteria for defining that state as ideal can be anything
that you wish them to be; indulge your deepest preferences. Now imagine
that, in the real world, you have not attained that ideal state. You are offered
a chance to change the real world, at a cost small enough to be insignificant
to your decision process, in a way that seems to move the world towards your

* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to David Lyons,
Mike Pardo, Larry Solum, and the participants at a workshop at Boston University School of Law
for their insightful suggestions, many of which I have unwisely not followed.
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favored outcome but without fully realizing the ideal state. Do you make the
change?
The obvious answer is something along the lines of "well, of course."
Who wouldn't want to make the world look more like their ideal at minimal
cost? It sounds too good to be true. And, indeed, it might in fact be too good
to be true. Those familiar with second best theory see the looming trap.
Second best theory "holds that where it is not possible to satisfy all the
conditions necessary for [a] . . . system to reach an overall optimum, it is not
generally desirable to satisfy as many of those conditions as possible." In
other words, if you are not moving all the way to the ideal state of affairs, it
is unclear whether partial moves that seem to go in the direction of the ideal
make the world "better" or "worse"-with "better" or "worse" defined by the
same criteria, whatever they may be, that defined your ideal in the first place.2
The world of second best is a messy place that often turns seemingly obvious
answers into nasty epistemological puzzles.
Second best theory is perhaps most widely known through its
formalization in neoclassical welfare economics,3 where it has a technical
meaning concerning non-Pareto states. But the basic idea that movements
within nonideal worlds are hard to evaluate, and that nonideal conditions in
one part of a system may call for seemingly nonideal moves in other parts of
the system, has found many applications in law, policy, and social science
more generally, in contexts ranging from national security law 4 to consumer

1. Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17

(2009).
2. For a characteristically thoughtful and accessible introduction to the concept of second best,
see Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 011: Second Best & Nonideal Theory, LEGAL

THEORY LEXICON (Apr. 25, 2021), https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheorylexicon/2003/
1 1/legal_theorylel.html [https://perma.cc/4CNH-J6XT].
3. The classic formulation appears in R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of
Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 12 (1956), with an important elaboration in Peter Bohm, On

the Theory of "Second Best," 34 REV. ECON. STUD. 301, 301-02 (1967), and an interesting
summary and clarification by one of the classic formulation's authors in Richard G. Lipsey,
Reflections on the General Theory ofSecond Best at Its Golden Jubilee, 14 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN.
349 (2007). I am not a great fan of neoclassical welfare economics. See generally Gary Lawson,
Efficiency andIndividualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53 (1992) (offering an "Austrian" critique of some basic
neoclassical assumptions, such as the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility and an
objective rather than subjective account of economic goods). Therefore, I express no view on the
merit or value of second best theory in that specific context. For discussions by law and economics
scholars who (unlike me) do buy into the neoclassical welfare framework, see Symposium on
Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics, 73 CHL-KENT L. REV. 3 (1998).
4. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalismas Counterterrorism,100 CALIF. L. REV. 887,
904-05 (2012) (arguing that judicial opinions in counterterrorism cases incorrectly assume
"branches are first-best exemplars" and that "the theory of the second-best suggests that predictions
based on the assumption of first-best conditions will be untrustworthy").
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protection law to separation of powers 6 to progressive politics.7 In those
myriad settings, the usual bite of second best theory is seen as cautioning
against overoptimism regarding seemingly positive moves toward ideal
positions and suggesting the deliberate introduction of countervailing errors
as a possible betterment strategy ("two wrongs sometimes make a right"). As
Adrian Vermeule aptly explains:
It is tempting to think that if it would be best for all variables in an
institutional system to take on their optimal values, then it would be
best for each variable to take on its optimal value, considering the
variables one by one. The general theory of second best, however,
exposes this idea as a fallacy of division. Because the variables
interact, a failure to attain the optimum in the case of one variable will
necessarily affect the optimal value of the other variables. Conversely,
even if some or even all the variables in the system take on suboptimal
or nonideal values, it is a fallacy of composition to think that the
system overall must be suboptimal or nonideal. The interaction
between several nonideal elements can produce an overall system that
is as close as possible to the ideal.8
These ideas have a long pedigree, tracing back at least to classical times.9
The basic implications of this extended-and therefore somewhat
metaphorical-conception of second best theory are powerful. Visualize the
ideal state of the world as the surface of a smooth pond. Now introduce four
jackhammers that churn the waters and create distortions in that previously
ideal state. You can restore the smooth-pond ideal by removing all four
jackhammers, but what if you remove three of them, or two, or just one? You

5. See Andrew T. Hayashi, Myopic Consumer Law, 106 VA. L. REV. 689, 693-94, 694 n.11
(2020) (identifying the author's argument as an "application of the general theory of the second best
to intra-personal choice").
6. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a ConstitutionalTheory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1994) (proposing
a "constitutional theory of the second best" as "a form of . .. damage control" in the wake of the
Supreme Court's "unwillingness" to invalidate the "post-New Deal administrative state" as
incompatible with the Constitution).

7. See Jacob Barrett, Social Reform in a Complex World, 17 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 103, 108
(2020) (pointing to second best theory as a justification for making institutions more progressive).
8. Vermeule, supra note 1, at 17-18 (footnote omitted). See Huq, supra note 4, at 904-05. In
discussing the second best theory, Professor Huq notes:
The [second best] theorem shows that once a system peels away from the ideal on one axis, and
thereby is second-best, welfare cannot be maximized by hewing to remaining first-best conditions.
As a result, a failure to optimize one variable in a complex system means that other variables may
need to take suboptimal values in order to secure a desirable result.
Id. (footnote omitted).
9. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 18-20 (discussing historical examples of second best
reasoning going back as far as Polybius); see generally Adrian Vermeule, Hume's Second-Best
Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2003) (exploring David Hume's use of second best
reasoning in connection with English governmental structure).
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don't know whether that is a positive move unless you know precisely how
the jackhammers interact with each other. Perhaps the fourth jackhammer
creates waves that trough out some of the waves caused by the first three,
resulting in a smoother surface than would exist with just three jackhammers.
Maybe adding a fifth jackhammer would create a wave interference pattern
that would be smoother than removing some, but not all four, of the previous
ones. Or maybe adding the fifth jackhammer would just make things much
worse. Without a precise knowledge of the interaction patterns among the
waves that is surely unattainable in many real-world situations, there is no
way to know the effects of these marginal moves in advance-and perhaps
no way to know those effects post hoc if the causal effects of individual
pieces of a complex system are unascertainable. The possible variations on
this theme are endless.
So understood, second best theory is a tremendously important and
wildly underappreciated phenomenon.10 I do not intend here to explore either
the fallacy of division or the fallacy of composition emphasized by Professor
Vermeule, though both fallacies eminently merit careful consideration and
deeper treatment in another forum. Rather, my goal in this Essay is to show
how second best theory is even more important and (for want of a better
word) subversive than its most familiar applications suggest. Second best
considerations lurk at the core of all processes of applying knowledge,
including, but not limited to, legal knowledge. Put simply, even assuming
away the costs of acquiring and processing new information, decisions based
on more knowledge will not necessarily better accomplish any defined
goal-whether that goal is pursuing a substantive conception of justice,
obtaining an economic equilibrium, or acquiring truth-than will decisions
based on less knowledge. The capacity of additional information to lead to
better decisions depends on (1) the shape of the path towards full or ideal
knowledge, (2) one's location on that path at a particular moment of decision,
and (3) the likelihood that one will be able to follow that path to its end. All
three of these factors are highly contingent and often difficult, and perhaps
impossible, to ascertain. The bottom line is that knowing less can sometimes
lead to better decisions than knowing more. That will not always be the case.
But it might sometimes be the case. And figuring out in any given instance
whether one is dealing with a "not always" or a "sometimes" case can be very

difficult.
Part I of this Essay sketches the epistemological problems posed by the
application of second best theory to knowledge in general, highlighting the
importance of knowing the shape of the path to knowledge in any given

10. Explaining why it is underappreciated and underemployed (and defining the normatively
appropriate baseline level of appreciation and employment) is a task for someone else. For some
tentative thoughts, see infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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context. Whenever the path to knowledge is not continuously upward
sloping, there is a risk that acquiring and employing more knowledge will
place one in a worse position to make decisions than one was in before. And
oftentimes, there is no way to know what the path to knowledge looks like
until one has fully traversed it. Part II puts a special focus on the implications
of those problems for the role of expertise in legal decision-making. Experts
can help generate better decisions if, but only if, their contributions occur on
a portion of the path to knowledge that is upward sloping (or at least flat)
towards the evidentiary optimum. It would be possible for the law to make
administrative agencies or litigants that rely on experts take account of these
epistemological realities in evaluating the deference appropriate to agency
decisions or the admissibility of expert testimony in litigation. To some
extent, the law already does so without explicitly acknowledging that
considerations of second best underlie its doctrine. Part III ruminates-no
stronger word is warranted-on some possible responses to these pervasive
problems of second best epistemology.
My goal throughout this Essay is to raise questions and provoke thought,
not to provide answers to what might well be intractable problems. Then
again, maybe those problems all have simple solutions that I have missed; I
would be entirely happy with that result if it proves to be so. But the only
way to find out if there are answers is to start a serious conversation about
the questions, and that is what I hope to accomplish here.

I.

Less Is More . . . Unless It Is Less

Every judgment, on any subject matter in any context, is made in light
of a specific body of evidence, which one can call the "evidence set" for that
judgment. For humans, who are not omniscient beings with unlimited time
and resources, the evidence set for any judgment will necessarily consist of
less than everything in the universe. People have to make decisions on the
basis of the information that they possess and can reasonably acquire. Indeed,
given the limitations of time, space, and human cognition, it is quite likely
that any particular evidence set will consist of substantially less than
everything that could be relevant to the formation of an accurate judgment
on the matter for which the evidence set was assembled. In those cases (which
might well be all cases), if one has good reason to believe that the evidence
set in a particular case is incomplete, and if one's goal is to make an accurate
judgment, is attempting to construct a larger evidence set for that decision a
good idea?"

11. This question is independent of how one cognitively processes whatever evidence set one
ultimately ends up having. Whether reasoning from that evidence set follows a frequentist
probabilistic approach, a Bayesian probabilistic approach, or some form of non-probabilistic
reasoning, the process of reasoning (whatever form it takes) operates upon a specific evidence set.

&
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Part of the answer to that question depends, of course, on the costs of
acquiring and processing new information, including the costs that result
from having to reconfigure and reanalyze evidence that one has already
assembled. For purposes of this Essay, I want to put aside all of those crucial
considerations of information acquisition and processing costs and assume
that one can add relevant material to the evidence set at a minimal cost." I
am also assuming away any questions about the risk preferences of the actor;
one can plug in any value for the actor's risk preference and nothing will
change. 13 From the standpoint of pure decisional accuracy, independent of
any considerations of cost or risk preference, how could having more
concededly relevant evidence ever be worse than having less? How can
relative ignorance ever be a better basis for accurate decision-making than
relative expertise?
It is actually quite easy for that to happen. A complete evidence set,
properly applied, will, by definition, yield the most accurate judgment. 4 But
the results from even perfect application of incomplete evidence sets are

12. If anyone is interested in my ramblings on the cost issues when they are not assumed away,
those ramblings can be found at GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS

133-35, 138, 142, 144-45 (2017).
13. For an intriguing argument that risk aversion is sometimes a good reason not to seek
additional evidence, see Lara Buchak, Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and

Evidence-Gathering, 24 PHIL. PERSP. 85, 108-09 (2010). I am grateful to Michael Pardo for
bringing this argument to my attention.
14. At the risk of tedium: I make no claims about what constitutes proper application of an
evidence set or how one specifies the contours of an ideal evidence set. In particular, I say nothing
about how one defines the reference class for probabilistic judgments. See Ronald J. Allen
Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value ofMathematicalModels ofEvidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD.
107, 114-16 (2007) ("The reference-class problem demonstrates that objective probabilities based
on a particular class of which an item of evidence is a member cannot typically (and maybe never)
capture the probative value of that evidence for establishing facts relating to a specific event."). I
believe that the key points about second best theory apply without regard to how one defines ideal
states or evidence sets. It is, however, possible -I am not a philosopher, so I am not certain that
the present argument has relevance only to a correspondence account of truth i.e., "the idea that
truth consists in a relation to reality," but not to a coherentist account of truth-i.e., the notion that
that "the truth of any (true) proposition consists in its coherence with some specified set of
propositions." Marian David, The CorrespondenceTheory of Truth, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (May 28,
2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/
[https://perma.cc/3W35-MP6H];

James

O.

Young, The Coherence Theory of Truth, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (June 26, 2018), https://

plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/
[https://perma.cc/XXS4-JWQB].
Because
the
relationship among propositions is itself an aspect of reality, coherence theories may be a subspecies
of correspondence theories, in which case second best problems are truly universal. At a minimum,
however, the second best problems outlined here apply to the classical version of a correspondence
theory, to which I subscribe and which the law takes for granted. See Gary Lawson, Proving the

Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 866 & n.23 (1992) (defining the correspondence theory of truth as
reflecting a view that "reality exists independently of its acknowledgment by any conscious mind,
and the cognitive function of consciousness is to perceive this preexisting reality, not to create its
own objects of knowledge"); MIRJAN R. DAMA KA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 95 (1997) ("[U]nless
some variant of the view that truth is a matter of correspondence to facts is accepted, our present
evidentiary arrangements are deprived of meaning.").
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much less clear. A smaller, incomplete evidence set can be epistemically
"better" as a basis for decisions-i.e., more likely to gauge reality-than a
larger, but still incomplete one.
Posit, as the epistemological ideal, perfect application-whatever one
thinks that means in any given context-of a fully complete evidence set that
contains all potentially relevant information. In order to attain that ideal, one
must first assemble the complete evidence set. Absent something like the
cosmic cube or the infinity gauntlet, that assembly process must take place
over time and space; in the words of the old Johnny Cash song, you "get it
one piece at a time."15 Thus, at any specific moment before the evidence set
is fully assembled, you will have a subset of the complete evidence set,
resulting from whatever assemblage efforts you have made up to that point.
Any new evidence acquired that does not complete the evidence set will
move you some distance along the path to completeness. And any decision
that is made without the fully complete evidence set will be made at some
specific point along that path. That is where second best theory rears its head.
If the path to perfect decisional accuracy is continuously upward
sloping, one can plausibly say that more information leads to better
judgments than does less information-or at least that more information will
not lead to worse judgments than will less information. Every marginal move
along such a continuously upward-sloping path is, by definition, a step in the
right direction. But what would justify such an assumption about the path to
knowledge? There are many possible shapes of a path to knowledge. Some
paths might be upward sloping and linear, in which case more knowledge
will always be better than less at a consistent rate. Some paths might be
continuously upward sloping but nonlinear, in which case more information
will always be better than less but in varying degrees. (The different degrees
do not matter for purposes of this Essay, but they could matter a great deal if
one tried to integrate acquisition and processing costs into a model of
decision-making.) Some paths might be wavy, like a sine curve, but with a
gradual upward slope. In that case, more information could lead either to a
peak or a trough, depending on where you start and what you add. One can
even imagine paths to knowledge that are downward sloping for most of their
real-world time but then dramatically rise near the end of the path. In those
instances, more knowledge will systematically lead to worse decisions until
the very end of the path. Consider, for example, the possibility of an afterlife.
One is not likely to acquire much affirmative evidence for such a thing during
one's life, and the longer one lives and looks, the less probable the result will
appear. But if hypothetically, an afterlife actually exists, one will gain a very

15. JOHNNY CASH, One Piece at a Time, on ONE PIECE AT A TIME (Columbia Records 1976).
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important addition to the evidence set upon dying. 16 At that point, the
relevance of new evidence to good decision-making will tilt sharply
upward-though perhaps too late to make any actual contribution to good
decision-making. What seemed like contributions to good decision-making
during life will be shown to be part of a long, downward-sloping portion of
the path.1
Suppose that the path to knowledge has dips and gullies as it gradually
rises to completion. At any given point on that wavy curve, adding new
evidence to the evidence set-i.e., moving forward toward completenessmay send you on a downward spiral, at least for a time. Of course, if you
acquire every relevant piece of information, you will eventually get to your
goal of perfect accuracy, so more information is better than less if the
acquisition of more information completes the evidence set. At any specific
point along that path short of completeness, however, moving "forward" may
leave you in a worse position than staying put or moving "backward."
Of course, moving forward might in fact make you better off. Second
best theory does not remotely say that more knowledge is always worse than
less. It says only that, much of the time, you don't know (and possibly can't
know) whether that is the case. To know whether you will be made better or
worse off from a specific marginal move increasing the size of an evidence
set requires knowing (1) the shape of the path to fully accurate knowledge,
and (2) where you are on the path at the moment of that particular marginal
move.
Examples of such phenomena are easy to imagine, especially when one
is engaging in inferential or abductive reasoning. 18 Suppose that one is trying

16. Cf JOHN HICK, FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE 195 (2d ed. 1966) (employing the possibility of
an afterlife to allow religious claims to satisfy the verificationist criteria for cognitively meaningful
statements).
17. This possibility lies at the core of Pascal's Wager. See Richard Popkin, Pascal, Blaise, in 6
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 51, 54-55 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) ("[S]ince eternal life and
happiness is a possible result of one choice (if God does exist) and since nothing is lost if we are
wrong about the other choice . .
then the reasonable gamble, given what may be at stake, is to
choose the theistic alternative.").
18. On abduction, see Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Inference to the Best

Explanation (Abduction), LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Dec. 27, 2020),

https://lsolum.typepad

.comlegaltheory/2020/12/legal-theory-lexicon-inference-to-the-best-explanation-abduction.html
[https://perma.cc/59ES-LG5D]. I harbor a suspicion that abduction may be reducible to some
combination of deduction and induction, but people who are definitely smarter than I am about this
sort of thing believe otherwise. See Gary Lawson, Comment on Brewer: Form and Content in Legal
Proof (or Why Everybody Wins-or at Least Gets a Participation Trophy), 97 B.U. L. REV. 2321,
2325 (2017) (admitting that "hav[ing] never thought carefully about whether analogy and abduction
are epistemologically reducible to induction and deduction or are possible sources of knowledge in
their own rights," Scott Brewer's "chances of [] being right are pretty good"); Scott Brewer,
Agonophobia (Fear of Contest) in the Theory ofArgument?: The Case of Gary Lawson's Evidence
of the Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2303, 2312 (2017) ("There are exactly four modes of logical inference:
deduction, induction, analogy, and abduction (synonymously 'inference to the best explanation').").

2022]

The Epistemology of Second Best

755

to decide whether an adverse personnel action against an employee was taken
as a result of anti-union animus in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act. 19 The evidence set at time T consists of a body of testimony and
documents showing acts of insubordination and incompetence by the
employee. A reasonable judgment based on that evidence set would suggest
reasons besides anti-union animus for the action. At time T2, we add to the
evidence set a document written by a manager saying, "We need to fire this
employee because of her union organizing." Now it starts to look like maybe
the initial judgment was mistaken. 20 Then, at T3, we add that (a) the
manager's document was written on April 1, (b) the manager who wrote it
was a known prankster who loved making jokes on April Fool's Day, and
(c) there are documents purporting to be from that manager from April Fool's
Day of each of the previous five years saying similar things about other
employees, none of whom ever suffered any adverse personnel actions. The
initial judgment starts looking better again. We then add at T4 , after further
investigation, that the documents from the previous five years were all
forgeries. Which of those marginal additions to the evidence set leads to a
"better" decision?
There is no way to know the answer without already knowing the "right"
decision that would be made in light of the fully complete evidence set
(which, of course, may include many items going well beyond those listed
above). But whatever the "right" answer may be, half of the additions to the
evidence set described above will point you in the "wrong" direction. The
above example illustrates the point starkly because each addition to the
evidence set materially affects the decision that would likely be reached at
each discrete point in time. But the bite of second best theory does not depend
on having new items of evidence change the tentative decision. Even if all of
the items added at T1-T 4 pointed in exactly the same direction, it would not
mean that they were pointing in the "right" direction rather than leading you
to progress (or regress) along a temporary downward spiral on a sometimes
downward-sloping path to knowledge. Perhaps adding further evidence will
merely give one a false sense of confidence in a decision that will eventually
be shown to be wrong once the evidence set is complete and one sees where
one happened to be on the curve at that past moment of decision.
To be sure, there is an argument for expanding the evidence set that does
not depend on whether any particular marginal addition will immediately
lead to a better decision. If the new evidence is part of the ideal evidence set,
one cannot get to the complete evidence set without acquiring that piece. One
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2018) (establishing that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to hire or terminate an employee "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization").
20. Bayesians can easily translate anything said in this Essay into the language of updating
probabilities. That translation will not change anything regarding the basic problems of second best.
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must travel the entire path of the curve, with all of its ups and downs (if
indeed it has ups and downs), in order to get to the end. Isn't it, therefore,
valuable to have that evidence in hand as a necessary step on the path to
completeness?
If one has good reasons to think that one might eventually end up with
a complete evidence set, then there is an argument-putting aside, as we have
been doing, questions of cost and risk preference-for taking those necessary
steps. But how likely is it that one will eventually end up with a complete
evidence set? If that prospect is remote-or its likelihood is simply
unknowable-then planning for that eventuality may not make much sense.
If the stopping point on your journey to truth is going to be an evidence set
that is less than fully complete, then the only relevant question for purposes
of decisional accuracy is whether, at any given margin, additional evidence
puts you on an upward- or downward-sloping part of the path to accuracy.
And that is something that is very hard to know. Throw in the thus-farneglected matters of cost, and acquiring more evidence can be a very
problematic move.
More importantly for present purposes, even if acquiring that additional
evidence makes sense as a long-term move, that does not tell you what to do
with that additional evidence at the present moment of decision. Maybe it
should be part of your present decision process. Maybe you should just bank
it for the day, if that day ever comes, when the evidence set is complete, and
you should ignore it for now. Whether to acquire more information and
whether, in a present decision, to use new information that has been acquired
are two distinct inquiries,21 and they might have different answers.
Hence, for purposes of any specific decision process, more knowledge
might be better than less knowledge, but it might not. That is really all that
second best theory has to say-though that is concededly quite a bit.
As framed thus far, the point about second best theory is one of general
epistemology. It applies to all judgments in all contexts. There is nothing
distinctive about its application to legal judgments. But since I am a law
professor rather than a philosopher, the most obvious applications that leap
to my mind involve legal judgments, so I will apply this notion of second best
theory to a pervasive legal problem: the role of experts in legal decisionmaking.
II.

When Experts Aren't

Law has no monopoly on the use of experts, but experts play a crucial
role in many aspects of law. The use of experts in litigation is notoriously

21. See Buchak, supra note 13, at 108 (comparing "evidence-using," which primarily serves
epistemological goals, with "evidence-gathering," which serves both epistemological and practical
goals).
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pervasive; studies show that anywhere from sixty to ninety percent of
litigated cases involve expert testimony. 22 Evidence law worries enough
about expert testimony to craft special rules regarding it.23 And modern
administrative law is, to a large extent, structured around the idea of
expertise, which, for more than a century, has been the central justifying
notion for the administrative state. As Reuel Schiller explains:
Progressive reformers of the 1910s and 1920s proffered expertise as

the solution to a host of problems disturbing the social order at the
beginning of the twentieth century. They believed that the scientific
method could be applied to these problems. Technocratic experts,
having arrived at a solution to a given problem, should be allowed to
implement it. 24

This reverence for expertise in administrative law goes beyond being "a
part of the narrative explaining legislative delegations to administrative
agencies."2 It "so deeply pervades the scholarly literature that it is difficult
to isolate highly relevant pieces. "26 More pointedly, it underlies the Supreme
Court's validation of legislative subdelegations, as was encapsulated in the
Court's refreshingly straightforward comment that "in our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives."27
In prior work, I have discussed at length the constitutional issues
involved in legislative subdelegations, 28 and in current work I am exploring

22. See Andrew W. Jurs, Expert Prevalence, Persuasion, and Price: What Trial Participants

Really Think About Experts, 91 IND. L.J. 353, 356-59 (2016) (examining both the frequency of
expert testimony used in civil trials and the mean number of experts used in each trial). Most
of those studies are dated and all of them are limited, so they provide at best only a rough
estimate of the frequency of expert witness use. See id. at 364-65 ("In sum, updated baseline
research is necessary since much of the basic baseline data about experts is twenty or more years
old, and while it is extensive, there remain many unresolved questions about experts."). A rough
estimate that amounts to "lots of experts" is good enough for my purposes.
23. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702-706 (outlining the necessary qualifications for an expert
witness as well as scope and limitations of expert testimony).
24. Reuel E. Schiller, The Era ofDeference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence ofNew Deal

AdministrativeLaw, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 413 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
25. Emily Hammond Meazell, PresidentialControl, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61

DUKE L.J. 1763, 1772 (2012) (emphasis added).
26. Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegatingfor Trust, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 644 (2018). My choice
for the most relevant piece would be Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to UnderstandExpertise in
Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1097

(2015).
27. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
28. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, "A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY":
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 109-26 (2017) (discussing conceptions of the
non-subdelegation principle and agency theory as they existed in the eighteenth century); Gary
Lawson, A Private-Law Frameworkfor Subdelegation, in THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE BEFORE
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the nature of expertise and how non-experts can identify and evaluate the
claims of experts. 29 I want to put both of those very large topics aside for the
moment and focus on a much more specific problem: Assuming that one has
correctly identified a topic appropriate for expertise and an expert appropriate
for that topic, and assuming that the expert is honestly and competently
applying expertise to that topic, is there good reason to think that reliance on
the expert will improve decisional accuracy?
The stakes of this inquiry are very high, as recent events involving
COVID-19 amply demonstrate. Regardless of which governmental level or
institution one picks-federal or state, executive or legislative-the decisions
regarding a public response to COVID-19 have all been cloaked in the mantle
of "expertise." For most of 2020, Anthony Fauci30 and Deborah Birx" were
as visible as President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence at
White House press conferences discussing COVID-19.32 Not much has
changed regarding reliance on expertise under President Joe Biden and Vice
President Kamala Harris. Indeed, as a candidate, Joe Biden said that
"leadership requires listening to experts and communicating credible
information to the American public" and that as President he would "[e]nsure
that public health decisions are made by public health professionals and not
politicians."3 3 Numerous state governors and members of Congress say the
same thing on a daily basis.
THE SUPREME COURT: PERSPECTIVES ON THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 123 (Peter J. Wallison
& John Yoo eds. 2022) (discussing the "line-drawing problem" for permissible and impermissible
subdelegation); Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The "Proper"Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 236 (2005) (seeking to prove that there is a
strong constitutional basis for traditional non-subdelegation doctrine); Gary Lawson, Delegation

and OriginalMeaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 333-34 (2002) (exploring the original textual basis for
non-subdelegation doctrine).
29. See Gary Lawson, The Fiduciary Social Contract, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Summer 2021, at

25, 46-47 (2021).
30. Dr. Fauci has been director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases for
more than three decades. John Travis, Meet Anthony Fauci, the Epidemic Expert Trying to Shape
the White House 's CoronavirusResponse, SCI. INSIDER (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.science.org
/content/article/meet-anthony-fauci-epidemic-expert-trying-shape-white-house-s-coronavirus-

response [https://perma.cc/2LGF-5TND].
31. Since 2014, Dr. Birx has been U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and U.S. Special
Representative for Global Health Diplomacy, and for most of 2020 she was the federal
government's Coronavirus Response Coordinator. Deborah L. Birx, MD., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE

(Jan. 20, 2017-Jan. 20, 2021), https://2017-2021.state.gov/people/deborah-l-birx-md/index.html
[https://perma.cc/DT5F-AKFZ].
32. See, e.g., Kenya Evelyn, Trump's Top Health Officials Seen but Not Heardas Coronavirus

Focus Shifts, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/
may/16/coronavirus-health-experts-birx-fauci-trump
[https://perma.cc/79WZ-C54D] (discussing
Fauci and Birx's reemergence after a brief withdrawal following their heavy media presence beside
Donald Trump).

33. Joe Biden, FACT SHEET: The Biden Plan to Combat Coronavirus (COVID-19) and
Preparefor Future Global Health Threats, DEMOCRACY IN ACTION (Mar. 12, 2020), https://
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The only noteworthy aspect of this real and proposed allocation of
decisional authority is its public notoriety. Every day, crucial decisions on
matters ranging from monetary policy to air pollution standards are less
visibly made by unelected officials whose claims to power are rooted in
supposed expertise. Four Supreme Court Justices have even suggested that
agency department heads, who are political appointees, have a legal
obligation to defer to the technical judgments of career experts within those
agencies.34 And why not, one might ask? Who would want decisions on such
matters made from ignorance rather than from expertise?
The answer to that last question depends on the shape of the path to
knowledge, where you are on the path to knowledge at a given moment in
time, and where along that path reliance on expertise will move you.
Depending upon the answers to those questions, the ignorant might be better
deciders than the informed. Sometimes one might be able to make a
reasonable guess about those matters by extrapolating from past experience
with similar decisions. Past performance is no guarantee of future success,
but it is not nothing, especially if it can give reasons to think that there are
continuously upward-sloping paths to knowledge in certain circumstances,
so that more knowledge in those settings can confidently be expected to lead
to better decisions. If someone has successfully constructed hundreds of
bridges that are still standing, there is good reason to think that the person
knows something useful about bridge construction and that reliance on their
expertise is likely to get you a good bridge. In circumstances where empirical
evidence of success rates is not readily available, however, figuring out the
shape of the path to knowledge is a much dicier operation. In those
circumstances, making the assumption that experts will do better than nonexperts is something of a blind guess (or perhaps an article of faith or
ideological predilection).
Put another way: In any given context, there is an optimum amount of
knowledge that will, in that context, yield the best possible judgment. A
supraoptimal amount of knowledge is potentially just as bad as a suboptimal
amount for purposes of decisional accuracy at a particular moment in time
and space. In order to justify reliance on expertise, one must have some
reason to think that, at the moment of decision, the non-experts possess a
suboptimal amount of knowledge and that the experts can supply the
optimum. Simply comparing the quantum of knowledge of the expert and

democracyinaction.us/2020/biden/bidenpolicyO31220coronavirus.html

[https://perma.cc/

6KH2-KB6F].
34. See Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2590 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Secretary of Commerce for introducing a citizenship
question for the census against the recommendation of the Census Bureau). The majority opinion
rejected this position. See id. at 2571 (accusing Justice Breyer's opinion of "subordinating the
Secretary's policymaking discretion to the Bureau's technocratic expertise").
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non-expert does not do the trick. As with Goldilocks, you need the amount
of knowledge that is just right for the task at hand-neither too little nor too
much.
Again, I emphasize that this is not remotely a categorical defense of
relative ignorance as a basis for decisions. There are surely contexts in which
more knowledge is better than less; otherwise, I would be out of a job very
quickly. Some paths to knowledge do seem as though they are continuously
upward sloping, or at least close to it, at clearly identifiable points along the
path. The point is only that more knowledge is not necessarily better in every
context. Sometimes it is going to be better, and sometimes it is going to be
worse. It all depends on some context-sensitive factors that are often very,
very difficult to know or even to guess about intelligently. Quite possibly,
there is no way to make those judgments ex ante with any accuracy; the proof,
if proof is ever to be found, will be in the ex post pudding when and if one
can compare the results from application of different levels of knowledge in
various settings.
Some potential legal implications follow from second best epistemology
and its application to reliance on expertise. In administrative law, for
example, one of the enduring problems is how non-experts such as judges
(and law clerks) can evaluate the decisions of administrative agencies that
are purportedly based on expertise. Suppose that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration determines that reducing the crash-test speed
at which automobile bumpers must sustain no damage from five miles per
hour to two-and-a-half miles per hour will generate net positive benefits,
claiming that the combined cost, fuel, and financing savings from lighter
bumpers will outweigh the increased repair costs from more bumper damage
in low-speed collisions, with no appreciable effects on either driver or
pedestrian safety.35 Those judgments are based largely on, among other
things, engineering models that extrapolate from a limited body of field tests,
economic models that make assumptions about things like discount rates, and
judgments about the likely relative effects of regulations regarding bumper
integrity and bumper placement. Opponents of the new regulations challenge
the agency's judgment across all of these fronts. How are judges and law
clerks-who are not engineers or economists, and who are not likely to be
trained in empirical methods-supposed to adjudicate claims that the
agency's judgments are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law"? 36

35. Why this example? For no better reason than that I spent six months of my life working on
this problem as a law clerk, and the administrative record from that case is thus unhappily burned

into my brain. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1338-42 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2018).
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The New Deal answer, reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act's
highly deferential ("arbitrary" or "capricious") language, was simply for
judges to get out of the agencies' way and leave them alone unless their
actions were so starkly irrational that they could not possibly have resulted
from the exercise of reasoned expertise.37 In the 1960s and 1970s, under
pressure attributable to changing perceptions of how agencies are wont to
behave, that deferential doctrine morphed into the modern approach under
which courts demand that agencies explain how they reached their
conclusions, even on technical matters. The courts, in other words, ask
only-but definitely ask-whether the agency has taken a "hard look" at the
problems before it.38 As the Supreme Court recently articulated the inquiry
while reviewing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ratesetting:
The disputed question here involves both technical understanding and
policy judgment. The Commission addressed that issue seriously and
carefully, providing reasons in support of its position and responding

to the principal alternative advanced. In upholding that action, we do
not discount the cogency of EPSA's arguments.... Nor do we say

that . . . FERC made the better call. It is not our job to render that
judgment, on which reasonable minds can differ. Our important but
limited role is to ensure that the Commission engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking that it weighed competing views, selected a
compensation formula with adequate support in the record, and

intelligibly explained the reasons for making that choice. 39

37. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 787-88 (9th ed. 2022) (offering
support for the assertion that the language of the American Procedure Act was drafted so as to
"permit only the most minimal judicial review of agency decisions").
38. The "hard look" idea is normally traced to GreaterBoston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444

F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), but the idea first surfaced in some decisions decided the prior
year. See Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("We are satisfied that
the Commission gave petitioners' predictions a hard look."); Wait Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153,
1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("On balance we conclude the Commission's treatment, with its 'combination
of danger signals,' belies the 'hard look' the application merited."). All three opinions were written
by Judge Harold Leventhal, and all three involved review of Federal Communications Commission
orders. The "hard look" principle, however, quickly migrated into general administrative law
doctrine well beyond the context of the FCC. See, e.g., Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d
1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("What counts is the reality of an opportunity to submit an effective
presentation, to assure that the Secretary and his assistants will take a hard look at the problems in
the light of those submissions.").

39. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016). The canonical
formulation of the "hard look" inquiry by the Supreme Court is found elsewhere, but the formulation
in State Farm is so vacuous as to be effectively meaningless. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the
United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The Court points out:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
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It is hard to see how courts could do much more (though it is easy to see
how they could do much less 40) in the face of competing claims of expertise
by agencies and those challenging agency decisions.
Second best theory suggests a modest but potentially important
modification to the current scheme for judicial review of agency technical
judgments. If agencies must give rational reasons for their actions-and if
those reasons are, in some instances, grounded in claims of expertise-then
some necessary premises of any agency claim for deference in those
circumstances are: (a) that the problem at hand is, in principle, amenable to
expertise; (b) that the agency has picked good experts; and (c) that there is
reason to think that those experts have actually applied expertise to the
problem. It is probably insufficient simply to assert, without further analysis,
that a particular kind of technical judgment "is assuredly the sort of expertise
that [an agency] preeminently possesses"41 without exploring to some degree
the preconditions for reasonable reliance on expertise in a specific setting.
More to the present point, it is also a necessary premise of a claim to
expertise-based deference that one has reason to believe that expert
knowledge moves one up rather than down the path to knowledge at the
specific point of decision at issue. What reason does the agency have to think
that application of expertise, in this specific context, will lead to a better
decision than reliance on, for example, common sense, political judgment, or
just plain old trial and error? Perhaps in certain cases there are reasons to
think that expertise makes a positive contribution to the decision, based on
past experiences with similar decisions, indications that one is likely dealing
with a continuously upward-sloping knowledge path, or some such thing.
Maybe there are reasons to think that, and maybe there aren't. If there are no
reasons in a specific case to think that more knowledge is better than less
knowledge, one can at least expect agencies to acknowledge that fact, with
whatever consequences that fact may have for the agency's willingness to
reconsider the decision in the future or to assert, with any given level of
confidence, expected benefits from its action. In any event, an essential
precondition to rational reliance on expertise is some showing that reliance
on expertise is rational. Second best theory contributes one small, but
potentially important, piece to the process of evaluating agency claims.
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.

Id.
40. For an argument that doing less is both descriptively accurate across a large range of cases
and normatively desirable, see Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114
MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1356, 1361 (2016). For a countervailing argument in favor of forcing agency
explanations of their technocratically based actions, see Emily Hammond Meazell, Super
Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109

MICH. L. REV. 733, 735-38 (2011).
41. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Acknowledgment of the limitations imposed by second best theory on
agency reliance on expert decision-making is especially pertinent doctrinally
in light of the Supreme Court's recent declaration in Dep't of Commerce v.
New York 42 that agency candor is a crucial part of reasoned decision-making.
For most of the nation's history, at least some portion of the decennial census
form asked respondents about their citizenship status. Questions about
citizenship were removed from the 2010 census, and in 2018, the Department
of Commerce proposed to reinstate citizenship questions for the 2020
census. 4 3 The Court summarized the Secretary of Commerce's stated reasons
for the action:
In March 2018, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross announced in a

memo that he had decided to reinstate a question about citizenship on
the 2020 decennial census questionnaire. The Secretary stated that he
was acting at the request of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
sought improved data about citizen voting-age population for
purposes of enforcing the Voting Rights Act (or VRA) specifically
the Act's ban on diluting the influence of minority voters by depriving

them of single-member districts in which they can elect their preferred
candidates. DOJ explained that federal courts determine whether a
minority group could constitute a majority in a particular district by
looking to the citizen voting-age population of the group. According
to DOJ, the existing citizenship data from the American Community

Survey was not ideal: It was not reported at the level of the census
block, the basic component of legislative districting plans; it had
substantial margins of error; and it did not align in time with the

census-based population counts used to draw legislative districts. DOJ
therefore formally requested reinstatement of the citizenship question
on the census questionnaire. 44

A trial court determined that the Secretary's stated reason was pretextual
based largely on evidence that the Commerce Department had decided to
reinstate a citizenship question as early as 2017 and subsequently induced the
Department of Justice formally to request the reinstatement on the basis of
the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The Court upheld the district court's
determination:
Altogether, the evidence tells a story that does not match the
explanation the Secretary gave for his decision. In the Secretary's
telling, Commerce was simply acting on a routine data request from

another agency. Yet the materials before us indicate that Commerce
went to great lengths to elicit the request from DOJ (or any other
willing agency). And unlike a typical case in which an agency may

42. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019).
43. Id. at 2562.
44.

Id.

(citation omitted).
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have both stated and unstated reasons for a decision, here the VRA
enforcement rationale the sole stated reason seems to have been
contrived.
We are presented, in other words, with an explanation for agency

action that is incongruent with what the record reveals about the
agency's priorities and decisionmaking process.

. .

. [W]e cannot

ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation
given. Our review is deferential, but we are "not required to exhibit a
naivet6 from which ordinary citizens are free." 45

While the specific holding of the case is merely that agencies are not
supposed to lie about their reasons for action, the principle behind that
holding runs deeper. Agencies can be less than candid about why they are
taking action in many ways more subtle than straightforward lies. They can
cloak an essentially ideological judgment in the language of technocracywhich, to be fair to agencies, is a practice forced upon them by a scheme of
judicial review that often refuses to regard political or ideological judgments
as legitimate reasons for agency action. 46 They can claim more certainty from
data than is warranted by the record. And they can ask for deference to
expertise when they have no good reason to think that expertise is actually
leading to a better decision.
Second best theory does not say that reliance on expertise is always and
everywhere unjustified. It says only that there are certain epistemological
preconditions for reliance on expertise and that those who claim legal force
for their actions because of expertise should have some reason to think that
those preconditions are satisfied-or at least should have the intellectual
honesty and modesty to admit that there is an open question about it when
there is genuine doubt. A small but important adjustment to "hard look"
review could require agencies claiming deference (or, as they sometimes
request on technical matters, "super-deference" 47) to include, as part of their
explanation, the reasons to think that expertise is valuable in this specific
context. What have agencies learned about the shape of the path to knowledge
that is relevant to their action? Where does the agency think that it stands on
that path? These are questions that are essential to decisional accuracy and
therefore to an assessment of the reasoned basis for an agency decision. These

45. Id. at 2575 (quoting United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Friendly, J.)).
46. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Placefor Politicsin Arbitrary and CapriciousReview,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 84 (2009) ("The judiciary's current formulation of arbitrary and capricious review,
which focuses on whether agencies have adequately explained their decisions in technocratic rather
than political terms, has incentivized agencies to hide behind technocratic facades.").

47. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1079, 1087-88 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(collecting circuit law to demonstrate the unique deference afforded agencies on matters within their
technical expertise).
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questions will not necessarily have clear answers, and one therefore cannot
demand that agencies provide a kind of certainty regarding the basis for their
decisions that is unattainable. But just as "hard look" review in general
focuses less on making sure that agencies get the right answers than on
making sure that agencies are at least asking the right questions, a second
best adjunct to "hard look" review can make agencies acknowledge
limitations on their claims that may presently be kept in the shadows. A
rational explanation of an agency's decision-making process would include
how epistemological second best considerations were addressed and either
accommodated or rejected. That would be a major step forward with regard
to candor.
The law of evidence could similarly make a modest adjustment-or
even a simple clarification requiring no modification-to its current
framework for handling expert testimony to take account of second best
concerns. Jurisdictions that follow or adapt some version of the Daubert48
framework for assessing the admissibility of expert testimony require trial
judges to screen proposed expert testimony to ensure, in the language of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, that:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
49
facts of the case.

It would not be difficult to consider, as part of inquiry (a), whether there
is reason to think that expert testimony in any specific instance will move the
decision process forward rather than backward along the relevant path to
knowledge. As with administrative agency experts, it would not be feasible
or reasonable to expect the proponent of expert testimony in litigation to
prove the unprovable by conclusively demonstrating the shape of the relevant
path to knowledge or how expert testimony will move along an upwardsloping part of the path. That is asking far too much. But it would be both
feasible and reasonable to insist that proponents of expert testimony, and trial
judges who are evaluating its potential helpfulness to the fact-finding

48. The framework gets its name from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). It is questionable whether the Daubert case actually sets forth what today is considered the
Daubertframework, but that kind of transformation of cases into doctrines that go well beyond the
cases for which they are named is commonplace. Obvious examples include Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat.

Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
49. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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process, at least consider whether there is any reason to think that expert
testimony will likely lead to better decisions. At a minimum, it is open to
opponents of such testimony to try to show reasons why one would not expect
expert testimony to prove helpful in a given context involving paths to
knowledge that are not continuously upward-sloping. Doctrinally, the
existing framework for judicial prescreening of expert testimony already
accommodates such arguments in principle; casting those concerns in terms
of second best problems may help clarify the basis for some of those
challenges to expert testimony.
The key doctrinal question is whether the burden of proof regarding
second best concerns is on the proponent or opponent of expert testimony.
Must the proponent come forward with affirmative evidence that reliance on
expert testimony makes sense in the case at hand or can the law plausibly
presume continuously upward-sloping paths to knowledge absent some
reason to think otherwise? Rule 702 suggests that the burden should be on
the proponent to make the affirmative showing required by Rule 702(a),
which includes a showing that expert testimony "will help . . . determine a
fact in issue." Expert testimony cannot reasonably be thought to help
determine a fact in issue if the epistemological preconditions for thinking that
it will do so are not met.
On the other hand, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is surely
possible to interpret Rule 702 to presuppose continuously upward-sloping
paths to knowledge in which expert testimony would presumptively satisfy
second best concerns. That presupposition may be factually false in any given
instance, but Congress is under no obligation to legislate in accordance with
objectively correct principles of epistemology. Thus, I am not saying that
Rule 702 unambiguously places the burden of proof on the proponent of
expert testimony to negate second best concerns. But it at least arguably does
so as a matter of plain meaning.
These are just two possible applications of second best epistemology to
recurring legal questions. There is nothing special about those applications
beyond their relevance to some of my current research projects. If second
best concerns are as universal as I posit them to be (at least for
correspondence theories of truth), then literally any subject area can generate
examples that give rise to analogous problems.
III. Avoiding Second Best Problems
Despite their ubiquity (and perhaps even universality), second best
concerns seldom rise to the forefront in legal discourse. It is not so much that
they are considered and dismissed as that they are not considered at all. Even
in welfare economics, where the concept has received its most rigorous
expression, second best theory sometimes seems to vanish from view. That
is not entirely surprising. Second best theory recommends caution, modesty,
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and qualifications on conclusions, and academics are not always receptive to
the idea that they might not have the definitive answers to everything. Second
best theory "is something of a party-pooper."5 0 As Richard Markovits once
hypothesized, "many law professors and an increasing number of economists
ignore Second Best Theory because they like clear bottom lines and correctly
perceive that . . . analysis [that takes account of second best considerations]
will often lead to conclusions that are fact-dependent and, on that account,
contestable." 1 "In other words, second[]best theory suggests that scholars
often cannot make the kinds of claims that they would like to make with the
level of certainty at which they would like to make them. Given a choice
between their preference for claim making and taking seriously the
epistemological problems posed by second-best reasoning, second-best
reasoning comes out a big loser.""
But perhaps there are more direct responses to second best theory than
sweeping it under a very large rug in a fit of academic ambition. Two possible
responses spring quickly to mind; I strongly invite anyone to suggest others.
One response is to shift the burden of proof-in the sense of a burden
of production 53-to the person alleging second best concerns. After all,
second best concerns are a series of "ifs," "maybes," and "mights." If paths
to knowledge are not continuously upward-sloping, then maybe more
knowledge will not be helpful because one might be on a downward-sloping
part of the path. Okay, what next? The real question is whether it makes sense
to believe, in a specific case, that one is-rather than might be-on such a
path. There are obviously occasions on which an assumption of a
continuously upward-sloping path to knowledge makes sense-and, over the
span of time, such an assumption may be the closest account of actual
knowledge development that one is likely to be able to generate. It is hard to
argue that, as a general proposition, there was a better basis for decisionmaking in the Bronze Age than there is today, even though no one today
would say that all relevant evidence sets are complete. If the appropriate

50. LAWSON, supra note 12, at 145.
51. Richard S. Markovits, Symposium on Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An

Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 8 (1998).
52. LAWSON, supra note 12, at 145.
53. The term "burden of proof' is ambiguous in that it can refer either to the obligation of
moving forward with evidence, or to the amount of evidence that one must produce in order to
warrant a conclusion. It is sometimes conventional to describe the former as a burden ofproduction
and the latter as a burden of proof or a burden of persuasion. (The classic work is John T.
McNaughton, Burden ofProduction ofEvidence: A Function ofa Burden ofPersuasion,68 HARV.
L. REV. 1382, 1382-83 (1955). For a modern summary, see Michael S. Pardo, The Paradoxes of

Legal Proof A Critical Guide, 99 B.U. L. REV. 233, 241-43 (2019).) If it were up to me, I would
call the former the burden of proof and the latter the standardofproof But it is not up to me, so I
will henceforth speak of the burden of production to describe the epistemological obligation to move
forward with evidence to establish a point.
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reference class is the entire sum of human experience, an assumption that
knowledge is better than ignorance is a pretty good working hypothesis. At a
more granular level, there are surely incremental additions to knowledge that
do not generate complete evidence sets but that certainly seem to generate
positive results by any plausible standard.
To be sure, that is not uniformly true. There are domains of decisionmaking where the march of history does not unambiguously point in one
direction; it is not obvious, for example, that moral theorizing necessarily
gets better over time. But perhaps there are enough domains where progress
seems to prevail over regress to warrant at least an initial presumption in
favor of approximating paths to knowledge as continuously upward-sloping.
Yes, there will be occasions when such a presumption is not warranted, but
then one would expect to see some affirmative evidence suggesting that X is
a circumstance in which a continuously upward-sloping assumption should
be seriously questioned. Perhaps it is incumbent on the person claiming the
existence of a second best problem in a particular circumstance to meet a
burden of production suggesting that one is on a potentially downwardsloping path to knowledge. Burdens of production are designed to place the
force of inertia on one or another side of a controversy. In circumstances
where knowledge is hard to come by, the placement of the burden of
production may well be decisive. Placing the burden of production on
someone raising a second best concern would remove that concern from
consideration in any case in which all that can be mustered is a vague
assertion of ifs, mights, and maybes. In this respect, the case against taking
second best epistemological problems too seriously tracks the case against
broad-based epistemological skepticism: The real question is not whether
theoretical objections to knowledge claims can be imagined, but whether
doubts are rationally warranted in specific cognitive contexts.54
On the other hand, this line of reasoning as applied to law may confuse
principles of general epistemology with principles of adjudication. As a
general epistemological matter, there is something to be said for the idea that,
over the long haul, more information is likely to lead to more accurate
decisions than will less information. That conclusion does not mean that one
should always pursue more information; such a judgment cannot be made
intelligently in any specific instance without taking full consideration of the
54. For my general assault against broad-based epistemological skepticism, see LAWSON, supra
note 12, at 30-35. If second best concerns turn out simply to re-create age-old skeptical arguments,
I will disavow this Essay as misguided. But I don't think that second best concerns are just
skepticism in another guise. Second best theory, as described in this Essay, tells one to think
carefully about the epistemological bases for truth claims. It does not say that no such bases can be
found, especially once one understands that knowledge is contextual and that the fundamental error
of Cartesian-like skepticism is applying an unrealistic standard of proof to truth claims. See id. at
33-34 (explaining that the core of Cartesian skepticism is the argument over at which threshold
something has been proven).
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cost factor that I have conveniently omitted from this Essay. But it does
suggest that truth-finding will, on average and all else being equal, tend to
benefit from more information rather than less.
Adjudication, however, is not about long hauls, averages, or general
epistemology-or even about truth-finding. It is about resolving specific
disputes. It is about how official force will be deployed to kill people, put
them in prison, or take property in someone's possession and place it
somewhere else. There is no serious pretense that those decisions about the
deployment of official force are based on epistemologically sound judgments
about objective reality. Adjudicative procedures-including most notably
evidentiary procedures-are driven by a confluence of forces, including
considerations of cost, privacy, and personal relationships, of which accurate
decision-making is only one. Formal privileges, which exclude from
consideration concededly relevant evidence, are only the most obvious
examples of trading off truth for other values. Considerations of cost limit
the extent to which any legal proceeding can develop as full an evidence set
as is metaphysically possible. A legal system committed single-mindedly to
finding out what really happened is a fantasy-and not necessarily an
attractive one, given the potential resource costs of finding out what really
happened in each litigated case.
Such considerations can cut both directions as far as second best
problems are concerned. On the one hand, they suggest that second best
concerns need to be taken more seriously in legal proceedings than in general
epistemology because of the individualized, one-off nature of most legal
disputes. On the other hand, if law is not really about truth finding, then
second best epistemological issues regarding truth finding may not be all that
significant. On the other, other hand, second best problems do not pertain
solely to truth finding. They affect the optimization process for any value
whatsoever.
Thus, a full account of the consequences of second best theory for law
must integrate second best concerns with a theory of epistemological burdens
of production, the economics of information, and a broad-based Grand
Theory of adjudication. That is all well above my pay grade, so at that point
I stop."
A second, related response links second best concerns to broader themes
in epistemology that require relaxing the assumptions made thus far about
zero-cost acquisition and processing of information. As much as welfare
economics posits general equilibrium as an ideal state, second best theory
posits the perfectly complete evidence set as the ideal state and then evaluates

55. See supra Introduction ("My goal throughout this Essay is to raise questions and provoke
thought, not to provide answers to what might well be intractable problems.").
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real-world knowledge claims by reference to that ideal. Maybe that is a big
mistake.
An omniscient being would not need epistemology. You only need
epistemology if you need some mechanism for sorting out claims to
knowledge in circumstances where fallibility is a serious concern. An
epistemology that takes omniscience as its standard or ideal makes no sense;
it disregards the reason for theorizing about knowledge in the first place. In
the real world, with real humans, all knowledge claims are put forward in a
given context, which includes (a) a given evidence set, and (b) a possible
evidence set that can plausibly be acquired given constraints on resources and
cognition. An evidence set that you cannot realistically acquire is not
"perfect"-just as a hammer (such as Mjolnir 6) that you can dream about,
but cannot actually possess, is not the "perfect" hammer for nailing a picture
to a wall. The "perfect" hammer for nailing a picture to a wall is the best
hammer for that task that you can actually acquire at the best cost. Similarly,
the "perfect" evidence set in any given context is simply the evidence set that
you can realistically acquire that is most likely to lead to the best decision at
the best price. That evidence set is necessarily going to be "incomplete" by
the standard of omniscience, but that standard is intellectually uninteresting.
The upshot of this response is not to dismiss or deny second best
concerns, but rather to doubt their significance for real-world affairs. Realworld decisions always take place within limited cognitive contexts, and the
problems posed by second best are one among a whole set of limitations. One
simply must muddle through as best one can, and criticizing such muddling
through from an unrealistic perspective is unproductive. Perhaps that is all
that one can say, and perhaps it is enough.
The point of this Essay is to pose these problems, not to resolve themand hopefully to get people (maybe even experts?) to think about them
carefully. So-what do you think about all of this?

It may be difficult for people who inhabit the world of higher education
to consider the possibility that their wider scope of knowledge might
sometimes-not always, but sometimes-put them in a worse position to
make decisions than those who know less. But that is what second best theory
says, and dismissing second best theory as a party-pooper does not make it
any less true.

56. Mjolnir, MARVEL DATABASE, FANDOM, https://marvel.fandom.com/wiki/Mjolnir [https://

perma.cc/AU2W-VR6W].

